

General Abrams  
(Comments on Abrams Cables re Vietnam War)

23 Aug 68 TOP SECRET William Bundy to The Secretary memo re Responses from General Abrams on the Effects of the Bombing in North Vietnam

25X1 23 Aug 68 [ ] Wheeler to White House responding to questions: What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam; What would be the military effect of a cessation of the bombing; Since March 31 what is the average number of trucks destroyed and trucks damaged per week and what is the average number of trucks sighted in the Panhandle per week; What is the estimate of military casualties inflicted on the enemy each week in the bombing of North Vietnam; ; and Is there any possibility of providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?

26 Aug 68 Blind Memo, Comments on General Abrams' Response to Mr. Rostow on the Effects of Ending the Bombing of North Vietnam

\*28 Aug 68 Bombing Effects Spread Sheet, including Rostow's Questions, MACV Response, DIA Response, Remarks

\*29 Aug 68 Carver to DCI Short Note forwarding Senator Boggs' 28 August remarks at the Democratic Convention (including a quotation from General Abrams' cable) -- transcript attached

30 Sep 68 Walsh to ADDI memo re Comments on General Abrams Response on Effects of a Bombing Halt

Attachments: Abrams to Rostow [ ] dated Sep 1968, further response to questions imposed in [ ] (see above) 25X1 25X1

Handwritten notes commenting on [ ]

4 Oct 68 IM, The Impact of Change in US Bombing Programs on Communist Logistics Activities, Copies 9 and 10 (report responding to Abrams cable [ ]) 25X1

9 Oct 68 Blind Memo, Comments on a Cable (Abrams' cable [ ]) 25X1

Attachment: Abrams to Wheeler Cable [ ] commenting on current enemy situation and tentative assessments of these developments 25X1

General Abrams  
(Comments on Abrams Cables re Vietnam War)  
(Continued)

25X1 \*30 Oct 68 Ch/I/L to DD/OER memo re Abrams to Wheeler Cable  
[redacted]

Attachments: Blind Memo, Comments on Abrams Cable of 27 Oct 68 (no date)

Handwritten notes, dated 30 Oct 68, commenting on Abrams Cable

Abrams to Wheeler Cable [redacted] evaluating the enemy's third offensive and possible significance for the future 25X1

25X1 31 Oct 68 Cable [redacted] commenting on Abrams Cable [redacted] 25X1

25X1 1 Nov 68 Cable [redacted] re Adm. McCain's comments to Gen. Wheeler and Gen. Abrams on a new comprehensive collection program for Cambodia, [redacted] 25X1

Attachment: Operations Center message re Status of Enemy Truck Movements as of 3 Nov 68, dated 3 Nov 1968

\*11 Nov 68 I/L comments on Abram's Cable, dated 11 Nov 68

Attachments: Blind Memo, Comments on MACV Estimate of Deliveries of Arms and Ammunition to Sihanoukville by Sea, December 1966-August 1968

I/TLC Blind Memo, OER Comments on Current MAC-V Views of VC/NVA Logistics, dated 13 Nov 68

Abrams to Wheeler Cable [redacted] dated 11 Nov 68, re Cambodia as a primary enemy LOC 25X1

19 Nov 68 OER Blind Memo, Comments on Abrams to Wheeler Cable Regarding Enemy Logistical Activity in North Vietnam and Laos -- [redacted] 25X1

25X1 Attachment: Abrams to Wheeler Cable [redacted] dated 18 Nov 68, re movement of military supplies, POL and building supplies into Laos 25X1

\* Filed loose.

General Abrams  
(Comments on Abrams Cables re Vietnam War)  
(Continued)

11 Dec 68 Abrams to Wheeler Cable [ ] re report from an 25X1  
unusually reliable agent of the possibility of the  
first phase of the winter-spring campaign being set  
for night of 12-13 December (including enemy  
emplacements)

25X1 18 Dec 68 [ ] to Ch/I/L memo re Preliminary Comments on ABRAMS  
Cable of 15 December on Cambodia

25X1 23 Dec 68 [ ] (I/L) to [ ] (ONE) memo re 25X1  
Preliminary Comments on ABRAMS Cable of 15 December  
on Cambodia,

9 Apr 69 Blind Memo, OER Comments on General Abrams Cable [ ], 25X1  
25X1 EYES ONLY, [ ]

(There is no copy of Abrams 15 Dec 68 cable in the file)

VIETNAM AFFAIRS STAFF  
O/DCI

DATE: 29 Aug 68


TO: The Director

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Attached for your information is a transcript of Senator Hale Boggs' 28 August remarks at the Democratic Convention. The quotation from General Abrams' cable is on the second page of this transcript.

  
George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

cc: DDCI w/att  
DDI w/att ✓  
D/OCI w/att

C  
U  
R  
R  
E  
N  
T  
  
I  
N  
F  
O  
R  
M  
A  
T  
I  
O  
N

# RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM	The National Democratic Convention	STATION	WTOP Radio CBS Network
DATE	August 28, 1968	12:30 PM	CITY Washington, D. C.

## COMMENTS OF SENATOR BOGGS AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

SENATOR HALE BOGGS: Ladies and gentlemen, I thank all of you for your time and your patience, your attention. I think that all of you must agree, and I am certain that the American people must agree, that we have debated here fully, openly, without bias, this issue before this convention.

I have reserved only a minute or two for myself, in conclusion. I would like to make the observation that try as we may, hope as we work as we must, that the world is indeed one world, that what happens everywhere in the world affects all of us. I would call to your respectful attention the language in the platform which says this: The tragic events in Czechoslovakia are shocking reminders that we live in a dangerous and unpredictable world. The Soviet attack, an invasion of a small country that only yesterday was Moscow's peaceful ally, is an ominous reversal of the slow trend toward greater freedom and independence in Eastern Europe.

And then I would turn to -- I would turn to another area on God's earth, the Middle East, the Middle East, my friends, and we spelled out in this platform, referring to the Middle East as strong as we could, and there was no disagreement. The Middle East remains a powder keg. We must do all in our power to prevent a recurrence of war in this area. A large Soviet fleet has been deployed to the Mediterranean, preferring short-term political advantage to long-range stability and peace. The Soviet Union has rushed arms to certain Arab states to replace those lost in the Arab-Israel war of 1967.

So we cannot, hope as we may, disassociate what happens all over the world.

And now, one final statement, and I will then ask the distinguished Chairman, my Majority Leader, of whom I am so proud, and who presides as a permanent Chairman of this great convention then to put the question.

I would say that I wish, I profoundly wish from the depth of my heart, with every ounce of conviction that I may have, that I could agree with my friend, Ted Sorensen from New York, when he said that there's nothing in the minority that would endanger our troops or that would not support our negotiators in Paris. I beg to take exception. I beg to take exception.

Now what do we say about bombing -- bombing -- listen to me, please -- those who agree and those who disagree. That is, indeed, the Democratic procedure. Bombing, stop all bombing of North Vietnam when this action would not endanger.... (Technical difficulties) ... Well, I along with others, representing both political parties, representing Americans let us -- me be certain about, representing every shade of opinion, including the Chairman of the distinguished Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, was briefed on Czechoslovakia, and I ask the question, I ask the question, can General Abrams supply an answer to me of this question, and I pose the question. Is there any possibility of your providing even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would face if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam unilaterally and unconditionally.

And the answer came back, and here I read it to you. These are not my words. These are the words of General Abrams. If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were to be suspended unilaterally, the enemy in ten days to two weeks could develop a capability in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has. I cannot agree -- I cannot agree to place our forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose." ①

That -- that, my friends -- that, my friends, concludes our debate. Thank you very much.

① Verbatim quote (omitted except that Abrams was "I can not agree" only once?) of two of the final three sentences of WHC-44-09. (Pentagonate Sentence: "It he should develop this ...." is omitted).

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7


Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/OER	8/29/68	✓
2	(Mr Walsh)		
3	4 F 18		
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: Paul, Here is a transcript of Sen. Boggs' quotation of Gen Abrams on the effectiveness of the bombing. (see p 2)			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
7E44			8/29

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7




This report is an indirect  
response to General Abrams  
EYES ONLY cable of 28 Sep. 68



25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

Mr. Helms has directed that the dissemination of this report be strictly controlled. It is not under any circumstances to be shown to or discussed with non-CIA personnel. Distribution within the Agency has been strictly limited and recipients are to exercise personal control of their copy.

# Intelligence Memorandum

THE IMPACT OF CHANGE IN US BOMBING PROGRAMS  
ON COMMUNIST LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES

**Top Secret**

4 October 1968

9

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
4 October 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Impact of Changes in US Bombing Programs  
on Communist Logistics Activities

1. The experience of over three and one-half years of observing the impact of the Rolling Thunder bombing programs shows little direct relationship between the level and nature of given interdiction campaigns and the movement of supplies from North to South Vietnam. The level of logistics activity is more directly related to the size of the enemy forces in South Vietnam, the level of combat, and enemy intentions. Hanoi seems fully capable of delivering to South Vietnam the level of men and supplies it deems necessary, even though the bombings affect the ease, speed, and cost of delivery. The Communists have taken full advantage of the opportunities presented by changes in the ground rules for the US bombing program to ease their logistic burdens and to improve the capabilities of the system. The logistics base has been shifted southward to points close to the current northern limits of US bombing activities, and antiaircraft defenses in the areas have been increased substantially. Hanoi apparently has been unwilling, however, to engage in any widespread deployments of its defensive military forces so long as it feels that there is any possibility of country-wide bombing or a threat of invasion.

The 1968 Bombing Program

2. The 1968 bombing program, particularly as modified by the current restrictions, has been the most highly concentrated interdiction campaign carried out thus far during the war. The new campaign is focused on a region that is only 12 percent of the total area of North Vietnam and has been directed almost exclusively against a logistics target system. If, for comparison purposes, we equate Route Packages I, II, and III with the area

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

25X1

currently open to bombing, we find that the 1968 campaign is significantly heavier both in terms of the number of attack sorties and tons of ordnance dropped. In the first six months of 1968, compared with the same period of 1967, the number of attack sorties over this area increased by 3 percent and the tons of ordnance delivered increased by 27 percent, as shown in the following tabulation:

	First Half 1967	First Half 1968
Attack sorties	37,610	38,640
Tons of ordnance	70,940	89,860

The increased intensity of the interdiction campaign is even more apparent if comparisons are made for the second quarter -- attack sorties have increased by 24 percent and ordnance dropped by 46 percent.

#### Effectiveness of the Program

3. This intensified interdiction program has yielded better returns in several respects. Truck kills, for example, are at significantly higher levels, increasing from an average of about 220 effective losses a month during the first quarter of 1968 to an average of 515 a month during the second quarter. [ ] watercraft destroyed increased from a monthly average of just over 100 in the first quarter to an average of 180 during the second quarter. The interdiction program also has compelled North Vietnam to divert an additional 12,000 fulltime workers to the Panhandle to cope with the effects of air attack.

4. The current program has also been carried out at a considerably reduced cost in terms of human casualties. The number of North Vietnamese casualties (military and civilian) resulting from air strikes in the first half of 1968 is estimated at about 6,300 persons, or just over 1,000 persons a month. This casualty rate is only one-third of

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

that inflicted on the North Vietnamese population during the 1967 campaign. The 1968 program has also been carried out with a significant decrease in US losses of personnel. The loss rate for US aircraft over North Vietnam during 1968 declined to a low of 1.3 losses per 1,000 sorties. More importantly, about one-half of the US personnel downed since 31 March were rescued, compared with recovery of less than one-third prior to 1968.

#### The Logistics Impact

5. The concentrated interdiction program has not succeeded, however, in reducing the flow of supplies from North Vietnam into Laos and South Vietnam. The flow of Rear Services supplies moving within the Panhandle of North Vietnam has shown steady increases during 1968, from a monthly average of some 90 short tons a day during the first quarter to more than 240 short tons a day during the second quarter. Supply activity has been maintained at about this same high level during the third quarter. Moreover, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] vehicle and watercraft activity as well as Rear Services traffic make it clear that the enemy is able to maintain this movement throughout the area being bombed. Some 50 to 60 percent of truck sightings during July and August were in Route Package I. About 30 percent of the supplies noted in Rear Services traffic with known final destination were destined for the DMZ area in the period from July to 22 September 1968. In the second quarter of 1968, only about 16 percent of these supplies were destined for the DMZ area.

6. The same high rate of supply movement has been maintained on Routes 15 and 137, the two major roads leading from Route Package I to southern Laos. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An even more significant development in 1968 has been the enemy's ability to maintain this movement into Laos during the current rainy season, as shown in the following tabulation:

25X1

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1



7. The failure of the interdiction program to bring about any meaningful reduction in the flow of supplies to South Vietnam is explained principally by two factors -- the extreme difficulty of interdicting a small, highly dispersed, easily repaired, and fleeting target system and the low level of logistics activity that this system is required to support. The latter point is illustrated by two examples. The daily tonnages moved from North Vietnam into southern Laos during 1968 require the utilization of only 15 percent of the capacity of the two main road arteries that carry this traffic. Similarly, a maximum of only 25 percent of the capacity of the several road connections between Laos and South Vietnam would be required to handle the tonnages that have been available during 1968. To preempt this kind of movement, the capacity of the road connections between North Vietnam and Laos would have to be reduced by 85 percent; the capacity of the road connections between Laos and South Vietnam would have to be reduced by 75 percent. The experience of the Rolling Thunder program to date indicates that *sustained interdiction* of about 25 percent of capacity probably is the best that can be expected on these rudimentary road networks.

8. With these road systems being utilized at a threshold so far below that which can be expected from air interdiction, it seems reasonable to conclude that the level of bombing is not the principal determinant of the flow of supplies. If the need existed, there is no reason to believe that North Vietnam could not increase the flow of military supplies to levels considerably in excess of those high rates being currently maintained.

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

Determinants of the Logistic Flow

9. The major determinants of the level of the enemy's logistics activities are the size of the force he maintains in South Vietnam, the level of combat, enemy intentions, and the amount of supplies destroyed or captured by Allied forces. All of these factors have contributed to a steady increase in logistics requirements during 1968.

10. The trend to high levels of logistics activity became apparent in the last quarter of 1967 at about the same time the enemy was mounting preparations for the Tet offensive. From January through August 1968, the size of the North Vietnamese Army presence in South Vietnam increased by more than 50 percent. At the same time, the scale of combat increased dramatically, most particularly at the time of the Tet and May-June offensives. The enemy's initiative this year is reflected in the fact that battalion-size attacks by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units during the first six months of 1968 exceeded the total number of attacks initiated in 1967. The net increase in Communist strength coupled with the expansion of enemy operations has contributed to a substantial increase in Communist resupply requirements in 1968. The total requirement for Communist forces in South Vietnam is estimated at about 290 short tons a day, with about 90 short tons of this amount coming from external sources. This represents an increase of more than 50 percent, compared with 1967, in the amount of supplies that must be moved from North Vietnam. The logistics task is also compounded by the success of Allied ground forces in capturing and destroying enemy supplies in South Vietnam. During the first nine months of 1968, Allied ground forces captured and destroyed more than 6,200 short tons of enemy supplies. If all of these supplies had to be replaced from sources in North Vietnam, the additional logistic requirement would amount to about 25 short tons a day. This is the equivalent of seven trucks a day, or only about 10 percent of the average daily tonnage delivered to southern Laos during the first eight months of 1968. Despite the increasing number of truck kills reported in recent months, only a small percentage of the supplies are being destroyed. Although no



TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

precise estimate is possible, it is virtually certain that enemy losses of supplies in transit do not exceed 20 percent and are probably not much greater than 10 percent. Losses at this rate do not add any significant increment to the logistics burden. This is particularly true of a system which operates at only 15 to 25 percent of capacity but is still able, on a sustained basis, to deliver supplies from North to South Vietnam at a daily rate twice that of actual requirements.


#### Adjustments to the Restricted Bombing Program

11. As they have during previous bombing pauses or restrictions in US bombing programs, the North Vietnamese were quick to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the current restrictions adopted on 31 March 1968. The measures adopted were generally aimed at improving the efficiency of their logistics system and improving their capabilities to withstand continued air attacks. The measures taken have been calculated and have not been at the cost of increasing the vulnerability or reducing defensive capabilities in the rest of the country.

#### Logistics Activities

12. A number of measures designed to improve and expand the logistics system have been undertaken since 31 March. The net effect of these steps has been a southward shift of the logistics base to points close to the northern limits of US bombing activities (see the map).

13. Soon after President Johnson's 31 March announcement restricting the Rolling Thunder program to the area of North Vietnam south of the 19th Parallel, there were indications that the largest rail yard near the bombing area at Thanh Hoa was being repaired and readied as a center for the transshipment of supplies south.



TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

The extent of transshipment activity as well as the amount of goods noted in storage throughout the city of Thanh Hoa have also continued at a high level since May. There has been a low level of supplies and materials stockpiled within the yard, and [REDACTED] the turnover of goods continues at a relatively fast pace. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

14. [REDACTED] the first tangible evidence of enemy efforts to improve and enlarge their logistic facilities within the bombing sanctuary area close to the 19th Parallel. Several extensive rail-to-road transshipment points had been put into active operation at Tu My located less than one mile north of the bombing restriction line. Although both of the rail spurs at this facility had been in place since at least January 1968, [REDACTED] this area had been largely improved [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

15. In the coastal areas just north of the 19th Parallel, several other improved transshipment areas have been developed in the general area of Qui Vinh (about 20 miles north of the 19th Parallel) and at Cho Giat (about 10 miles north of the 19th Parallel). Both of these areas are close to both the Hanoi-Vinh rail line and highway Route 1A -- the two major overland transport arteries connecting these areas with Thanh Hoa and points north.

25X1

25X1

16. [REDACTED] a large, new dispersed petroleum storage at Cu Dai, located about 15 miles south of the 19th Parallel. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

17. A Giant Scale mission [REDACTED] showed that a probable POL-type pipeline, first detected

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

under construction in July, is now about 30 miles in length, with the northern end extending into the Cu Dai storage facility. There is some likelihood that despite the storage facilities at Cu Dai, the northern terminus will eventually be farther north. It could easily be extended northward to meet the several storage transshipment points along the rail line or the key inland waterway located within the areas free of bombing.

#### Military Redeployments

18. With the exception of some large-scale redeployment of antiaircraft artillery defenses south of the 19th Parallel, North Vietnam generally has maintained the deployment of military forces that existed prior to 31 March 1968.

19. Antiaircraft artillery defenses south of the 19th Parallel have increased markedly since March 1968. The number of antiaircraft weapons deployed in the two southern Route Packages reportedly rose nearly 60 percent, from about 1,450 guns in mid-March to about 2,250 guns at the end of August -- the majority of the increase coming since June. This buildup was accomplished almost exclusively by deploying 37-mm and 57-mm weapons. The number of heavy (85-mm to 100-mm) guns deployed in the area during the same period has decreased. The number of SAM battalions estimated to be deployed in the region has remained at five despite the fact that the total in-country inventory of SAM battalions has been increased. There apparently has been no increase in the deployment of antiaircraft weapons in the Laotian Panhandle since 31 March. However, shipments of antiaircraft ammunition into southern Laos apparently rose sharply in August, indicating a possible increase in the deployment of 37-mm guns in Laos or South Vietnam during August or shortly before.

20. The overall evidence of rather limited deployment of North Vietnamese units and equipment, therefore, reflects a somewhat cautious policy and indicates an apparent unwillingness to degrade the country's defensive capabilities. The relatively rich target areas around Hanoi and Haiphong are still heavily studded with antiaircraft units, and SAM-defense capabilities in the area have been

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

increased. The regime also has taken measures to keep air and civil defense units in a high state of readiness and full alert. The lack of southward deployment of ground, artillery, and coastal defense units probably reflects a decision not to reduce the capability to defend against the possibility of invasion by Allied ground forces. Current estimates of the minimum home defense requirements of the North Vietnamese armed forces indicate that they could not engage in any large-scale southward redeployment of forces without significantly degrading their home-defense capabilities. Hanoi, in short, seems to be covering its bets and undoubtedly will not engage in any widespread deployments of its defensive military forces so long as it feels there is any possibility of a renewal of country-wide bombing or a threat of invasion.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02895R000300190001-7

CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION				REGISTRY			
SOURCE: DATE OF DOCUMENT: COPY NUMBER (S): NUMBER OF PAGES: DOCUMENT NO.: NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS:				CONTROL NUMBER: DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED: LOGGED BY:			
REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY	
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
DD/GER							

<input type="checkbox"/> Approval	<input type="checkbox"/> Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Action	<input type="checkbox"/> Direct Reply	<input type="checkbox"/> Return
<input type="checkbox"/> Comment	<input type="checkbox"/> Preparation of Reply	<input type="checkbox"/> Dispatch
<input type="checkbox"/> Concurrence	<input type="checkbox"/> Recommendation	<input type="checkbox"/> File

REMARKS:

*1/TLC*  
*Comments of I/L9 on Abrams*  
*Recent cable (11 Nov. 68)*

--

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02895R000300190001-7

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

**SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Comments on the ABRAMS CABLE

Paragraphs 1 - 5 require no comment

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

**SECRET**

25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

OER Comments on Current MAC-V Views  
of VC/NVA Logistics

1. In our view, MAC-V is considerably overstating Cambodia's present role in the VC/NVA logistical system. We believe their long-standing north - south overland supply routes from North Vietnam through Laos, South Vietnam and border areas of Cambodia are still the principal supply channel for Communist forces in South Vietnam. These routes not only remain capable of meeting Communist needs despite allied air strikes but actual truck traffic detected moving to southern Laos indicates that the volume being moved southward is sufficient to meet the external needs of Communist forces in adjacent and more southerly areas of South Vietnam. [ ] reports indicate that Laotian routes 15 and 912 were closed less than 13 percent of the time -- calculated on a daily basis -- in the period August - October 1968.

25X1

2. We are unable to quantify from observations the volume of supplies moving from the tri-border area southward over infiltration trails. We do not believe that the Communist use Cambodian controlled roads and waterways to move their supplies from the tri-border area southward into III Corps. Available evidence belies Communist use of the Cambodian portions of the Se Kong and Route 19 for southward movement of supplies, but substantiates northward and eastward flows. There is also evidence of eastward flow of supplies on the Tonle San, but none of westward flow, and no evidence of significant traffic in either direction on the Srepok. [ ] indicates that major segments of the infiltration trails through Kontum Province of South Vietnam and the eastern edge of Cambodia's Ratanakiri Province are

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

SECRET

being upgraded to roadable track. The fact that this construction activity is being carried out while native dissident actions have blocked all Cambodian roads into the area indicates that the Cambodians are not involved in the projects. This entire development constitutes an additional indication of Communist reliance on the north - south overland logistics route.

3. We consider the information provided [ ] in [ ] plausible evidence of high-level Cambodian complicity in the diversion of arms to the Vietnamese Communists from PAVN stores. Pending the completion of cross checks on the information [ ] we note only that the Cambodian supply system [ ] handled principally non-military goods and that the volume and frequency of arms deliveries were not specified.

4. In our view, there is insufficient evidence to clearly establish whether foreign military shipments to Cambodia have been excessive. Nevertheless, we see a considerably smaller volume of confirmed deliveries than MAC-V.

to probable deliveries of munitions under foreign military assistance contracts during the same period yields a total volume of  tons valued at about two-thirds of the total value of military assistance available for drawing by Cambodia during that period.

25X1

5. We question the validity of the estimate that FARK's average annual requirements for munitions is in the order of 350 tons. This estimate is based upon 1963 expenditure patterns, which may have changed considerably. We have no alternative estimate to propose. However, such an estimate is an essential factor in measuring military deliveries against FARK needs, since about three-fourths of the confirmed military aid shipments in the period cited consisted of ammo.

6. Interagency delegation will carry full details on these and other issues. We look forward to <sup>an</sup> mutually beneficial exchange of views.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		13 Nov 65
TO: <i>Paul</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<i>This what I'm giving</i> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> <i>on the</i> <i>Abrams cable. I/c</i> <i>concur.</i>		
FROM: <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

25X1

25X1

**SECRET**

25X1

Paragraph: 11

We can neither confirm nor deny the info in this paragraph.

**SECRET**

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 67 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI  
THROUGH: DDI

The attached OER comments on selected points in the recent Abrams cable were provided informally to [ ] and may be of interest to you.

[ ]  
PAUL V. WALSH  
Deputy Director  
Economic Research

9 April 69  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE 10 Apr 69	
TO:			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS:			
<p>Distribution:</p> <p>Cys 1 &amp; 2 - DCI via DDI</p> <p>3 &amp; 4 - Dean Moor (Member, NSC Staff)</p> <p>5 - DD/OER</p> <p>6 - SAVA</p> <p>7 - OCI [REDACTED]</p> <p>8 - Ch/D/I</p> <p>9 - Ch/I/SV</p> <p>10 - Ch/I/L</p> <p>11 - Ch/I/NV</p> <p>DD/OER: PWalsh [REDACTED]</p> <p>(10 Apr 69)</p>			
FROM: DD/OER		BY-3	
ROOM NO. 4-F-18	BUILDING Hq.	EX	[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE 31 December 1968
TO: D/OER		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: S-2908 - Preliminary Comments on Abrams 15 December Cable. Initiated 23 December for ONE [ ] for [ ] [ ] in preparing report on his trip to SEA.		
FROM: D/r [ ]		
ROOM NO. 4043	BUILDING Hqs	[ ]

FORM NO 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE <i>20 Dec 68</i>
TO: <i>DI/SEC</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: <i>D/I</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 25 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

In 0853

25X1 DIRECTOR [REDACTED]

25X1 FOLLOWING COMMENTS PER REF REQUEST NOT COORDINATED WITH

[REDACTED] IN VIEW OF TIME ELEMENT:

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. THERE IS MUCH THAT IS VALID IN GENERAL ABRAM'S ASSESSMENT. HOWEVER, ITS TONE IS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC, ITS CONCLUSIONS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SAFE GUARDED. OUR FEELING IS THAT THE SITUATION IS NOT ALL THAT BAD FOR THE EMENY -- AT LEAST NOT YET AND AT LEAST NOT UNLESS VERY SUBSTANTIAL, SUSTAINED MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTION CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR AGAINST HIM. IN IV CORPS, FOR EXAMPLE, WE BELIEVE TOO MUCH STOCK HAS BEEN PUT IN INDIVIDUAL, AND IN SOME CASES, ISOLATED SIGNS OF DETERIORATION WHICH SHOULD BE TEMPERED WHEN APPLIED TO THE CORPS AS A WHOLE. MILITARILY THE ENEMY IS IN POOR AND DECLINING SHAPE IN THE DELTA, BUT WE SEE NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH A CRITICAL SITUATION AS THAT SO STARKLY DESCRIBED IN GENERAL ABRAMS' REPORT. IN PARTICULAR,

25X1

PAGE 2 [REDACTED]

HIS FIFTH AND FINAL CONCLUSION THAT THE ENEMY "MUST EITHER LOSE WHAT HE HAS LEFT IN IV CTZ OR REINFORCE IT WITH UNITS FROM ELSEWHERE" APPEARS OVERDRAWN AND PREMATURE. THE ENEMY STILL OWNS LARGE AREAS OF IV CORPS BY ANYONE'S STANDARDS; AND HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DO SO UNLESS SUSTAINED MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESSURE OF THE TYPE APPLIED IN 60-61 IS BROUGHT TO BEAR ON HIM THROUGHOUT THE DELTA.



2. ALTHOUGH GENERAL ABRAMS' PRESENTATION IS BY DEFINITION MILITARY, WE ARE BOTHERED BY THE MENTION OF THE ENEMY'S POLITICAL EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. INDEED, THESE EFFORTS WHEN ADDRESSED AT ALL ARE WRITTEN OFF AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS DEMONSTRATING THAT THE ENEMY COULD NOT ACCOMPLISH HIS MILITARY GOALS. WHILE TO A LIMITED EXTENT THE ENEMY'S POLITICAL OFFENSIVE DOES DERIVE FROM HIS MILITARY POSTURE, IT IS MORE RELEVANT TO NOTE THAT HE HAS NEVER DIVORCED THE TWO ELEMENTS AND THAT THE 1967-68 WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN WAS BOTH A MILITARY AND POLITICAL OFFENSIVE OF MASSIVE PROPORTIONS. INDEED, THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE ENEMY'S ACTIONS OVER THE PAST YEAR APPEAR TO BE OF AS GREAT OR PERHAPS EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN THE MILITARY. THAT THIS

25X1  
PAGE 3

POLITICAL EFFORT THUS FAR HAS FAILED IN ITS BROADEST STRATEGIC GOALS IS CLEAR, AND THIS STEMS LARGELY, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY, FROM THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE THE BROAD MILITARY OBJECTIVES THE COMMUNISTS SET FOR THEMSELVES. NONETHELESS, THIS EFFORT IS A QUALIFIED SUCCESS IN THE SENSE OF A HOLDING ACTION, AND PERHAPS MORE THAN A QUALIFIED SUCCESS FOR POTENTIAL USE IN A FUTURE SITUATION WHERE THE GROUND RULES HAVE CHANGED AND THE ENVIRONMENT IS MORE POLITICIZED.

3. WE ARE BOTHERED BY THE DRAWING OF VERY DRAMATIC AND SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS BASED ON QUESTIONABLE METHODOLOGY AND ON REPORTS WHICH APPEAR IN SOME CASES TO BE DERIVED FROM LOW-LEVEL, OFTEN UNCONFIRMED, AND SOMETIMES SUSPECT SOURCES. MOREOVER, IN SOME CASES THERE ARE CONTRADICTORY REPORTS OF EQUAL VALUE OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, NON-VALUE. THREE EXAMPLES COME READILY TO MIND: THESE ARE REPORTS CONCERNING

CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE UNITS, AND REPORTS OF STARVATION  
ON MORE THAN ~~Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7~~  
TO THE REPORTS OF A YEAR AGO TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE ENEMY  
COULD BE SUFFERING FROM APPARENTLY VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] SAIGON 669 S E C R E T [REDACTED]  
AND STILL BE GEARING UP FOR A MASSIVE PUSH IN ALL FIELDS OF  
ENDEAVOR THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT  
IS THE CASE THIS YEAR NOR DOES IT PROVE THAT HIS PRESENT  
PROBLEMS, WHICH WE TOO THINK ARE NUMEROUS AND BECOMING WORSE,  
WILL REACH THE POINT OF NO RETURN. FOR EXAMPLE, IT DOES NOT  
APPEAR THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE THE ABILITY TO LAUNCH ANYTHING  
EVEN FAINTLY RESEMBLING THE TET OFFENSIVE AT THIS TIME, AND  
WE AGREE WITH GENERAL ABRAMS' LISTING OF THE FACTORS WHICH  
PRECLUDE SUCH ACTION. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE  
ENEMY'S PAST ABILITY TO OVERCOME OR AT LEAST TO LIVE WITH  
HIS PROBLEMS SHOULD RAISE CAUTION FLAGS ABOUT ANY CATEGORICAL  
ASSESSMENT THAT THIS TIME HE IS TEETERING ON THE BRINK.

4. WE ALSO ARE BOTHERED BY THE GREAT STRESS THAT  
GENERAL ABRAMS PLACES ON CAMBODIA. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT  
THAT USE OF CAMBODIA IS OF MOUNTING IMPORTANCE TO THE ENEMY  
AND GIVEN THE MILITARY FACTORS CONTAINED IN GENERAL ABRAMS'  
REPORT IT SEEMS LOGICAL THAT CAMBODIA WOULD BECOME EVEN MORE  
IMPORTANT AT LEAST AS LONG AS THE ENEMY CONTINUES HIS  
PRESENT MILITARY COURSE. HOWEVER, THIS IS BASED AS MUCH ON  
WHAT SEEMS LOGICAL AS ON WHAT CAN BE PROVED. WE BELIEVE THAT

25X1

MACV CLOUDS THE ISSUE BY APPARENTLY LUMPING ALL SUPPLY

ACTIVITY, BASED IN SOME CASES ON DUBIOUS REPORTING, OCCURRING NEAR THE CAMBODIAN/SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER AS BEING COMMUNIST ASSOCIATED, AND WE BELIEVE THAT MACV TRADITIONALLY HAS OVER-ESTIMATED COMMUNIST USE OF CAMBODIA AND HAS EMPLOYED QUESTIONABLE METHODOLOGY IN SO DOING. THIS IS CRITICAL BECAUSE IT COMPLICATES ARRIVING AT ANY BALANCED ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE ENEMY.

# B. SPECIFIC COMMENTS:

## 5. THE "THIRD OFFENSIVE"

THE ABRAMS' MESSAGE IS A FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF THE ENEMY'S "THIRD OFFENSIVE". HOWEVER, THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ANY INDICATION THAT THE ENEMY BELIEVED THAT THIS OFFENSIVE WOULD NECESSARILY BRING ABOUT A DEFEAT OF U.S. FORCES, DESTRUCTION OF THE GVN, AND ULTIMATELY A POPULAR UPRISING. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT HE HOPED THIS WOULD HAPPEN BUT HIS PLANNING APPARENTLY INCLUDED THE LIKELIHOOD OF LESSER ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND IN SOME AREAS HE SPECIFICALLY LAID OUT LIMITED GOALS. HE MET A DETERMINED ALLIED FORCE THAT WAS ABLE TO ACT REPIDLY ON INTELLIGENCE AND PRE-EMPT HIS PLANS. ~~HE WAS UNABLE TO GAIN~~

25X1

CITE SAIGON

25X1  
25X1

IMMEDIATE

SERVICE

CORRECT PORTION AT END OF SECTION ONE AND BGN SECTION TWO TO READ: "HE WAS UNABLE TO GAIN EVEN A MODEST <sup>V</sup>ICTORY DURING THE OFFENSIVE AND HE DID NOT CAUSE THE MAJOR REDEPLOYMENT."

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

13 13 z Oct 68

25X1 S E C R E T

25X1

IMMEDIATE SCWASHINGTON

SECTION TWO OF FOUR

25X1

PAGE 6 SC SAIGON 669

CAUSE THE MAJOR REDEPLOYMENT OF ALLIED FORCES AS HE HAD HOPED FOR. HIS PLANS FOR FOLLOW-ON CAMPAIGNS SHOWED UP EVEN AS THE THIRD OFFENSIVE WAS UNDERWAY. VARIOUS SOURCES REFERRED TO FUTURE OFFENSIVES IN LATE 1968 OR EARLY 1969. IN ADDITION, THE PLANS FOR HIS 1968-69 WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN INDICATED THAT IT COULD START AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER, OBVIOUSLY ALLOWING ONLY A SHORT PERIOD OF PLANNING AND PREPARATION HAD SUCH AN OFFENSIVE NOT BEEN VISUALIZED MUCH EARLIER.

#### 6. LOGISTICS

LOGISTICS HAS CERTAINLY BEEN A CONSIDERABLE PROBLEM FOR THE ENEMY, PARTICULARLY IN I CORPS. WE AGREE THAT THE GREAT DECREASE IN HIS MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES ALONG HIS NORMAL CORRIDORS WAS PARTIALLY DUE TO AN IMPROVED AIR INTERDICTION EFFORT, BUT THE MAIN REASON APPARENTLY WAS THE WEATHER, PARTICULARLY IN SEPTEMBER, WHEN STREAMS WERE FLOODED AND ROADS MADE IMPASSABLE FROM EXTREMELY HEAVY RAINS. THE RAINS ALSO DESTROYED CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES OF CACHED FOOD AND CONTRIBUTED TO HIS UNTENABLE POSITION IN MR TTH. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE LOGISTICS PROBLEM WILL BE RELIEVED, AS IT

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

ALWAYS HAS BEEN DURING THE NORTHEAST MONSOON SEASONS WHEN THE  
Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

LAOTIAN PANHANDLE ROADS DRY UP. WE DO NOT BELIEVE  
THAT THE AIR INTERDICTION EFFORT  
CAN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES THROUGH LAOS  
IF THE ENEMY IS DETERMINED TO MOVE THEM.

#### 7. INFILTRATION

THE POINT IS MADE THAT NVA INFILTRATION WAS PLANNED  
WITH A BIG SURGE FOR THE THIRD OFFENSIVE AND THAT FURTHER  
REPLACEMENTS WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING, AT LEAST IN THE  
IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IT IS TRUE THAT TRAINING FACILITIES WERE  
APPARENTLY STRAINED TO PROVIDE THE FORCES NEEDED AS WAS  
EVIDENCED BY THE SHORT TRAINING CYCLES THAT MANY PW'S  
AND RALLIERS CLAIMED THEY HAD RECEIVED. INFILTRATION WAS  
MUCH HIGHER IN 1968 THAN THE PRECEDING YEARS DUE TO THE  
CHANGE IN TACTICS TO MAJOR OFFENSIVE EFFORTS. THE HIGH  
FIGURE WAS ACHIEVED IN AUGUST WHEN 33,000 INFILTRATORS ARRIVED IN  
SOUTH VIETNAM AND ESTIMATES THE TOTAL FOR OCTOBER HAS DROPPED TO  
ABOUT 8,700. THE NUMBER OF INFILTRATION GROUPS BEING DETECTED  
ENTERING THE PIPELINE<sup>5</sup> IN NORTH VIETNAM HAS DECREASED CONSIDERABLY,  
BUT THIS COULD REFLECT AN ABSENCE OF PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE

25X1

25X1

25X1

ALSO, INFILTRATION

PEAKS AND LOWS ARE SEASONAL AND THE TIMING OF THE PRESENT LOW COR-  
RESPONDS TO THAT WHICH WAS NOTED LAST FALL. THE RATE OF INFILTRATION  
IN 1968 PROBABLY WILL NOT BE CARRIED INTO 1969 BUT THE SEASONAL  
FLUCTUATIONS PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO BE REFLECTED.

5. FOOD SHORTAGES

FOOD SHORTAGES CONTINUE TO BE A CHRONIC PROBLEM FOR

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

THE VC IN THE NORTHERN PART OF SOUTH VIETNAM, BUT THESE SHORTAGES ARE LIMITED BOTH IN AREA AND IN DURATION. THE TRI-THIEN-HUE MILITARY REGION, WHERE ALLIED MILITARY ACTION AND ADVERSE WEATHER REDUCED THE SIZE OF THE RICE CROP, DAMAGED RICE CACHES, AND SEVERELY LIMITED THE AMOUNT OF RICE AVAILABLE IS THE ONLY AREA WHERE THE FOOD SHORTAGE APPARENTLY BECAME CRITICAL. BUT HERE, AS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY, THE VC ARE ABLE TO MEET PART OF THEIR NEEDS THROUGH PROCUREMENT FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY AND BY PURCHASE IN GVN-HELD MARKETS.

25X1

25X

25X1

BULK OF THE RICE IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY IS GROWN IN THE NARROW COASTAL STRIP, THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM FOR THE VC IS MOVING THE RICE THEY COLLECT IN-LAND TO THE MOUNTAIN AREAS, WHERE THE MAJORITY OF THEIR MILITARY FORCES ARE.

SEPTEMBER 1968, STATED THAT THE CRITICAL FOOD SHORTAGE IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE CAUSED DIFFICULTIES FOR THE VC FORCES IN THE MOUNTAIN AREAS.

25X1

RESPONSE OF THE VC IN THE TRI-THIEN-HUE MILITARY REGION TO THE FOOD SHORTAGE WAS TO URGE THE PEOPLE TO ECONOMIZE ON RICE BY SUCH MEASURES AS A FAMILY RATIONING SYSTEM. THE KEY PROBLEM THE VC FACE IN MR TTH AS WELL AS IN OTHER REGIONS IS POSSIBLY ONE OF DISTRIBUTION. IN FACT, THE RECENT OUT-OF-COUNTRY RELOCATION OF MOST MR TTH FORCES MAY HAVE BEEN A RESULT OF THE FOOD SUPPLY PROBLEM.

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

9. IN THE PERIOD JUNE-OCTOBER 1968 REPORTS OF FOOD SHORTAGES, SOME TIMES COMBINED WITH SHORTAGES OF MEDICINE, HAVE APPEARED FROM THREE CORPS AREAS. IN I CORPS, TWO REPORTS IN OCTOBER 1968 INDICATE A DIRECT MILITARY EFFECT OF SUCH SHORTAGES: ONE STATED THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH FOOD

25X1 [REDACTED]

TO FEED THE VC TROOPS IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE AND THE OTHER COMPLAINED OF LACK OF MEDICINE IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE TO TREAT THE WOUNDED. IN II CORPS, THE MOST PERSISTENT REPORTS OF FOOD SHORTAGES HAVE BEEN FROM CERTAIN DISTRICTS IN BINH DINH PROVINCE. ELSEWHERE IN II CORPS, DIFFICULTIES WITH FOOD SUPPLY WERE REPORTED IN TUYEN DUC AND LAM DONG PROVINCES, WITH THE SHORTAGE REPORTEDLY SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH IN THE LATTER TO STALL A VC ATTACK PLANNED IN AUGUST. IN III CORPS, ONLY A FEW REPORTS OF FOOD SHORTAGES HAVE BEEN NOTED, SUCH AS IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE, WHERE SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND MEDICINE ALLEGEDLY CAUSED A DECLINE IN VC MORALE. IN IV CORPS, WHERE THE BULD OF THE RICE IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS GROWN, VC FOOD PROBLEMS CAN BE ASSUMED TO BE MINIMAL, THOUGH EVEN HERE OCCASIONAL DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN NOTED.

10. NVA/VC FRICTIONS. IN REGARD TO NVA/VC FRICTIONS, A RECENT REVIEW OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION SUGGESTS CAUTION IN ATTACHING TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS EVER PRESENT IRRITANT. INDEED, THE BULD OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT SUCH FRICTION IS NOT CRITICAL AND DOES NOT APPEAR LIKELY TO BECOME SO. THERE IS CERTAINLY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AN NVA WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE

25X1 S E C R E T [REDACTED]

BT

NNNN

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

SECTION THREE OF FOUR

MORE CATASTROPHIC FOR VC MORALE THAN ANY FRICTION CAUSED BY NVA PRESENCE.

11. III CORPS. WE AGREE THE III CORPS APPEARS TO BE THE FOCAL POINT OF FUTURE ENEMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE MOVEMENT OF THE 1ST NVA DIVISION HEADQUARTERS FROM II CORPS TO III CORPS SEEMS TO EMPHASIZE THIS. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THE SUBORDINATE UNITS HAVE ACCOMPANIED THE HEADQUARTERS AT THIS TIME, BUT THEY MAY FOLLOW AT A LATER DATE. WE WOULD ONLY ADD THE POLITICAL LEVERAGE CAN BE OBTAINED BY THREAT OF AN ATTACK AND THAT THE ACTUAL MOUNTING OF AN ATTACK ON SAIGON DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW FROM A DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS WHICH WOULD MAKE THIS POSSIBLE.

12. CAMBODIA. CAMBODIA IS THE ONLY TRUE "SANCTUARY" THAT THE ENEMY HAS BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIALLY FREE FROM ALLIED AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS AND THE ENEMY HAS SPENT MANY YEARS DEVELOPING THE AREA FOR HIS USE. IN ADDITION TO THE SANCTUARY STATUS, THE USE OF THE "PARROTS BEAK" PLACES HIS FORCES WITHIN 65 KILOMETERS OF SAIGON. ALTHOUGH LOW LEVEL REPORTS OF DUBIOUS RELIABILITY INDICATE THAT SOME ENEMY SUPPLIES ARE SHIPPED THROUGH THE PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE VOLUME IS NEARLY AS GREAT AS MACV CLAIMS. MOREOVER, THE TOTAL ORDNANCE IS COMPUTED BY ADDING THE AMOUNT OF UNIDENTIFIED OR REPORTEDLY MILITARY CARGO CARRIED BY SUSPECT SHIPS ENTERING SIHANOUKVILLE. FURTHER WE DO NOT BELIEVE

25X1

THE [REDACTED] OPERATIONS STOP ALL OTHER CLANDESTINE SEA

SUPPLY AS THE NAVY CLAIMS IT DOES. WE DO FEEL THAT SUPPLIES

POSSIBLY COME THROUGH CAMBODIAN PORTS AND BEACHES BUT IT SEEMS

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

PROBABLE THAT MOST COME DOWN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE INTO NORTH-



25X1

13. [REDACTED]

573 VESSELS APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

TO LAOS. THESE VESSELS WERE CARRYING 756 TONS OF RICE, ENOUGH TO FEED 24,000 MEN FOR ONE MONTH. THE NUMBER OF BOATS SEEN ON THE TONLE KONG WAS COMPUTED BY ADDING THE SIGHTINGS OF BOATS

25X1

[REDACTED] WHILE THESE REPORTS ARE SUPPOSEDLY

25X1

RELIABLE, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

GOING NORTH OF SIEM PANG WAS UNLOADED ONTO TRUCKS TO BE TAKEN TO RATANAKIRI PROVINCE FOR USE BY THE VC/NVA IN BASE AREAS 701 AND 702 OR FOR CONSUMPTION BY THE FARK TROOPS IN THE PROVINCE. THE LATTER POSSIBILITY MACV TENDS TO IGNORE.

25X1

14. [REDACTED] REPORTS DID NOT STATE THE AMOUNT OF RICE MOVING

25X1

NORTH. IN FACT, [REDACTED] STATED SPECIFICALLY THE THERE WAS NO INFORMATION ON THE AMOUNT OF RICE CARRIED ON THE BOATS. IN

25X1

[REDACTED] THE AMOUNT OF 100-KILOGRAM BAGS CARRIED VARIED FROM TWELVE TO FIFTY, DEPENDING ON THE SIZE OF THE BOAT. THE 756 TON FIGURE USED BY MACV CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A RELIABLE FIGURE.

12. IV CORPS. THE ALLIED MILITARY SITUATION IN IV CORPS IS BETTER THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST. APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7 OPTIMISM BUT ON MORE GUARDED TERMS. THE TONE OF HIS REPORT IS ONE WHICH LEAVES YOU FEELING THAT THE DELTA HAS BEEN WON AND THAT THE ENTIRE VC STRUCTURE IS SHOWING SIGNS THAT IT WILL COMPLETELY CRUMBLE ANY DAY NOW. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY HAS BEEN DEALT A SERIOUS BLOW IN IV CORPS AND IS NOT IN A POSITION TO MOUNT SERIOUS OFFENSIVE ACTION IN IV CORPS--POPULAR APATHY, RECRUITING DIFFICULTIES, AND VERY LOW TROOP AND CADRE MORALE BEING CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. THIS COULD BE DECISIVE IF PROPERLY FOLLOWED UP, BUT IT WILL TAKE TIME, PATIENCE, AND SWIFT ACTION TO PUT THE VC OUT OF COMMISSION.

16. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IV CORPS HAS EVOLVED AS

A RESULT OF AGGRESSIVE GVN CORPS COMMANDERS BEING ASSIGNED TO

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1 THE DELTA

ALSO THE U.S. 9TH DIVISION WAS ASSIGNED TO THE DELTA. THESE FORCES (U.S./ARVN) HAVE PUSHED OUT OF STATIC DEFENSIVE POSITIONS INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE AND HAVE HIT THE VC IN AREAS THAT THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY FELT WERE SAFE. THESE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN HEAVILY SUPPORTED BY AIR POWER, ARTILLERY, AND NAVAL FORCES. EXAMPLES OF THESE OPERATIONS ARE THE SUMMER ATTACK IN THE SEVEN MOUNTAINS AREA AND MORE RECENTLY IN BASE AREAS 470 AND 474. PRESENTLY AN OPERATION IS BEING LAUNCHED AGAINST BASE AREA 482. THIS SUSTAINED PRESSURE AGAINST THE ENEMY, WHICH WAS THEN MAINTAINED DURING THE SOUTHWEST MONSOON SEASON, HAS SCATTERED VC FORCES AND HURT HIS MORALE. COUPLED WITH THE PURELY MILITARY ACTION, THERE HAS BEEN A DETERMINED DRIVE AGAINST THE VCI THROUGH THE PHOENIX PROGRAM WHICH IS PRODUCING BETTER RESULTS ALL THE TIME. ALSO THE PEOPLE OF THE DELTA HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN RESISTING VC RECRUITMENT AND TAXATION WHICH COMPOUNDS THE ENEMY'S PROBLEMS AND FURTHER HURTS HIS MORALE. IN SHORT, THE ALLIES ARE COOPERATION AND COORDINATING WITH EACH OTHER IN A AGGRESSIVE MANNER AGAINST ALL ASPECTS OF THE ENEMY AND THIS IS CAUSING THE PEOPLE TO RESIST THE VC ALTHOUGH THIS CERTAINLY DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE PEOPLE ARE NECESSARELY PRO-GVN.

17. IV CORPS WILL REQUIRE STRONG ACTION, MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, TO EXIST AT THE DESERTION RATE. ~~Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7~~ NOT BELIEVE THAT THE VC WILL REMAIN CONFUSED AND DISARRAYED FOR VERY LONG. IT IS TRUE THAT THERE ARE MANY INDICATIONS OF SAGGING MORALE BY BOTH CADRE AND SOLDIER, BUT SOME OF THE MORE SPECTACULAR INFORMATION IS LOW-LEVEL AND OF QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY, AND THESE APPEAR TO BE SOMEWHAT ISOLATED INCIDENTS. IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT THE HOI CHANH RATE HAS INCREASED RECENTLY, BUT THE FACT THAT MOST OF THESE RALLIERS ARE COMING FROM GO CONG PROVINCE IS ONE REASON TO DOUBT THAT THIS IS A CORPS-WIDE TREND OF SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS. SOME OF THE FORCES THAT WERE BADLY MAULED AND PUSHED OUT OF BASE AREA 470 MOVED TO GO CONG AND THEIR DESERTION RATE IS PROBABLE DUE TO THE BAD SITUATION THEY WERE IN. UNITS THAT ARE BADLY MAULED SHOULD HAVE A HIGHER DESERTION RATE, ESPECIALLY IF MANY OF THE OFFICERS AND CADRE ARE LOST.

18. IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT IV CORPS IS A BIG PLACE AND THAT THE ENEMY IS HURTING IN MANY AREAS BUT THAT HI IS NOT ABOUT

25X1 S E C R E T

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

13 59 z Oct 68

25X1

FINAL SECTION OF FOUR

[REDACTED]

TO CRUMPLE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. POLITICALLY, THE PROLIFERATION OF <sup>3</sup>LIV<sup>3</sup>ERATION COMMITTEES IN ~~ANY~~ MANY IV CORPS PROVINCES, IN FACT, ARGUES FOR THE THESES THAT THE ENEMY RETAINS CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CONTROL. MILITARILY, THE VC MAY ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE SITUATION IN THE WAYS SUGGESTED BY GENERAL ABRAMS AND WE ARE SURE HE WILL NOT ABANDON THE DELTA. IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT DESTRUCTION OF THE VC IN IV CORPS THE ALLIES WILL HAVE TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS AND PRE-EMPT <sup>E//</sup>ENEMY COUNTER-MEASURES. EVEN WITH INCREASED ACTIVITY AGAINST VC MILITARY UNITS AND THE VCI AND AN ACTIVE CIVIL ACTION PROGRAM IT WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TIME TO WIN IN THE DELTA.

25X1

S E C R E T [REDACTED]

BT

NNNN

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 20 Page(s) In Document Exempt

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION		TOP AND BOTTOM	
<input type="checkbox"/>	UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/>	CONFIDENTIAL
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/OER		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Ch I/L			9 Oct
<input type="checkbox"/>	UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/>	CONFIDENTIAL
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

(40)  
\* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O-587282

Next 15 Page(s) In Document Exempt



**SECRET**

26 August 68

**SUBJECT:** Comments on General Abrams' Response to Mr. Rostow  
on the Effects of Ending the Bombing of North Vietnam

1. We agree with many of General Abrams conclusions on the effects of halting the Rolling Thunder program. A halt in the bombing would result in the following:

a. Thousands of air defense and LOC workers would be freed for other duties. We believe this is one of the major costs that the bombing imposes on the North Vietnamese.

b. Supplies, including POL and ammunition, and personnel could move with greater ease and rapidity to South Vietnam.

c. The railroad could be reopened as far south as Vinh.

d. Additional trucks be made available to support the enemy forces in South Vietnam.

e. Artillery, aircraft, air defense and ground forces could be massed north of the DMZ with greater ease than at present.

2. However, we disagree with much of the data in the message and some of the conclusions that stem from this data. The message does not make, except in discussing the direct military effects of a bombing halt in the area immediately north of the DMZ, a strong case for continuing the bombing. It overstates the effectiveness of the air interdiction program against truck traffic and fails to recognize that the bombing has never placed a relevant ceiling on the volume of supplies that the North Vietnamese can send, if they

SECRET

[REDACTED]

25X1

choose, to the south. Specifically,

a. There is no justification for the conclusion that air attacks have been the primary agent for reducing truck sightings [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Agreed DIA-CIA data show that trucks sightings in July averaged only 155 a day.

b. Trucks sighting data are used erroneously to support an estimate that one week after a bombing halt southward traffic would again be moving at the reported mid-July level [REDACTED] and this would represent an increase of 1500 tons a day of goods moving south. Truck sightings, however, reflect traffic moving in all directions on many missions and cannot be equated exclusively to a southward flow of supplies to South Vietnam.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

- 2 -  
SECRET

[REDACTED]

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

e. Estimates of from 5,000 to 10,000 enemy casualties a month from the Rolling Thunder program are too high. All estimates of enemy casualties from the Rolling Thunder program are subject to wide margins of error, but our research shows that total civilian and military casualties have not been much more than 1000 a month this year.

f. A several-fold increase in the enemy's logistical capability in the Panhandle will not necessarily result in a corresponding increase in Allied casualties. The enemy's ability to inflict casualties on Allied forces is more dependent upon the availability of communist combat units in South Vietnam and the enemy's ability to move men and supplies within South Vietnam, where his forces would still be subject to air and ground interdiction.

~~SECRET~~

25X1

*23 aug 68*

EYES ONLY

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/OER (Mr. Walsh)		
2	4 F 18		
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: Paul Thanks,			
FOLD			
FROM: NAME		DATE	
C/DDI Exec St		26 Aug	

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM	
CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

### OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/OER (Mr. Walsh)		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

#### Remarks:

Attached for your information is  
a copy of Bill Bundy's comment to the  
Secretary on General Abrams' cable on  
the effects of the bombing.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER	
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS	DATE
C/DDI Exec Staff	27 Aug

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/11/30 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000300180001-7

1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET